______________________
Timeline and Victims
Edgar Chamorro:
16. At the end of January 1983, I was instructed to relocate to Tegucigalpa, Honduras, to establish and manage the FDN’s communication office. ¶
The CIA station in Tegucigalpa, which at that time included about 20 agents working directly with the FDN, gave me money, in cash, to hire several writers, reporters and technicians to prepare a monthly bulletin called “Comandos,” to run a clandestine radio station and to write press releases. ¶
I was also given money by the CIA to rent a house, office space and automobiles and to obtain office supplies and communications equipment. ¶
I also received money from the CIA to bribe Honduran journalists and broadcasters to write and speak favorably about the FDN and to attack the government of Nicaragua and call for its overthrow.
Approximately 15 Honduran journalists and broadcasters were on the CIA’s payroll, and our influence was thereby extended to every major Honduran newspaper and radio and television station. ¶
(I learned from my CIA colleagues that the same tactic was employed in Costa Rica in an effort to turn the newspapers and radio and televisions stations of that country against the Nicaraguan government.) ¶
I worked very closely in all of these matters with several CIA agents based in Tegucigalpa, but most closely with one of the deputy stations chiefs, named “George,” who had drafted the FDN’s first press statement in Miami and was then transferred to Tegucigalpa to continue working with us. ¶
Together with “George,” and subject to his approval, I planned all the activities of my communications office and prepared a budget. ¶
The budget was reviewed by the CIA station in Tegucigalpa and, if approved, sent to Washington to obtain the necessary funds, which were always provided to me in cash.
• Edgar Chamorro, affidavit dated September 5 1985, filed September 10 1985 as “Supplemental Annex G” to the “Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits)” (filed April 30 1985), reprinted, volume 4, pages 445-454, ¶ 16 at 449-450 {“Sorry, this page's content is restricted”} {pages 1-455: 20.1mb.pdf/text, source}, I.C.J. Pleadings (Case No. 70), Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (U.N. I.C.J.: International Court of Justice, The Hague, Case No. 70), 5 volumes (2000-2001) {UNBISnet: ICJ753-ICJ757, ISBN: 9210708237, 9210708245, 9210708253, 9210708261, 9210708288, LCCN: 2001380451, OCLC: 44106220, WorldCat}, volume 4 (2001) {UNBISnet: ICJ756, ISBN: 9210708261} (“Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits); supplemental documents,” 14+532 pages) {pages 14+1-455: 20.1mb.pdf/text, source, pages 456-532: 3.3mb.pdf/text, source, I.C.J. files dated April 15 2007}, series, I.C.J. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents {UNBISnet, ISSN: 0074-4433, LCCN, UCal}.
_______________
Edgar Chamorro:
Another element of the public relations work directed at people inside Nicaragua, or on the border with Honduras, was the FDN’s “clandestine” radio station Rádio 15 de Septiembre. ¶
I say clandestine, because it was not officially recognized by the government of Honduras. ¶
However, it was not actually hidden. ¶
It operated openly, with implicit support from the Hondurans, and the FDN public relations office oversaw its productions. ¶
There were also other clandestine radio stations financed, directed, and monitored by the CIA to help the contras. ¶
One in Costa Rica for Edén Pastora’s group, “Frente Revolucionario Sandino” (a member of the ARDE coalition), called Rádio Sandino. ¶
And one on the Atlantic coast aimed at the Miskitos, called Rádio Misura. ...
Rádio 15 de Septiembre was located on a hill outside Tegucigalpa, convenient to our offices. ¶
We got technical assistance for maintaining equipment from the CIA, and a CIA man helped oversee the daily production of programs. ¶
The tape for each day’s program was prepared and edited in the morning and then broadcast 5 times: once at 4:30pm, when the peasants return to their houses after work; again at 8:30pm, for those in the cities; again at 11:00pm; at 5:30am the next morning with a few changes; and finally that day at noon. ...
The programing included a section of combat news. ¶
When triumphs, advances, and special offensives by FDN troops were announced (regardless of their actual successes or failures). ¶
As a way to boost morale among the troops and to persuade others to join the contras. ¶
There were diatribes against the Sandinistas. ¶
Accusing them of human rights violations, mistreatment of prisoners, rapes and assassinations, and of running a communist dictatorship whose leaders lived in palaces. ¶
Programs also included slogans, songs, news commentaries, and an occasional forum with visiting commentators.
• Edgar Chamorro, Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation, pages 25-26, 45, 66 (Institute for Media Analysis, New York City, 1987) {ISBN: 0941781089, ISBN: 0941781070, OCLC: 17534021, WorldCat}.
• January 5 1984—Tegucigalpa Honduras.
Edgar Chamorro:
24. On January 5, 1984, at 2 am, the CIA deputy station chief of Tegucigalpa, the agent I knew as “George,” woke me up at my house in Tegucigalpa and handed me a press release in excellent Spanish. ¶
I was surprised to read that we — the FDN — were taking credit for having mined several Nicaraguan harbors. ¶
“George” told me to rush to our clandestine radio station and read this announcement before the Sandinistas broke the news. ¶
The truth is that we played no role in the mining of the harbors. ¶
But we did as instructed and broadcast the communiqué about the mining of the harbors. ¶
Ironically, approximately two months later, after a Soviet ship struck one of the mines, the same agent instructed us to deny that one of “our” mines had damaged the ship to avoid an international incident.
Edgar Chamorro, affidavit dated September 5 1985, pages 18-19, reprinted, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), volume 4, page 452 ¶ 24 {pages 1-455: 20.1mb.pdf/text, source} (cited above).
_______________
Query: “George”?
Edgar Chamorro: George eventually gave me his card. ¶
When he was at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa. ¶
It said he was Segundo Secretario, Embajada de los Estados Unidos. ¶
And that his name was John W. Mallett.
Edgar Chamorro, Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation (cited above), page 11, accord page 50.
Query: “John W. Mallett”?
Another fictitious name?
–CJHjr
Sources for the following events (CAHI, LCC, DGS, FBIS), U.N. documents, Washington Post archive, New York Times archive, Wall Street Journal archive:
• February 24 1984—Puerto El Bluff, Zelaya Sur.
CAHI: “Sea Raiders attacked fuel deposits in El Bluff {near Bluefields on the Atlantic coast}. They planted mines which blew-up 2 Nicaraguan fishing vessels the following day.” DGS: “They also attacked fishing vessels Aldo Chavarría and Pescasa 15, causing minor damage, and scattered mines as they left.”
• February 25 1984—Puerto El Bluff, Zelaya Sur.
DGS: “The fishing boat Pescasa 15 was sunk after hitting a mine and Pescasa 23 was damaged when it hit 2 mines. In all, 7 people — including Jaime Dans and Pedro Laponte—were wounded and 2 disappeared.” LCC: “A fishing boat (El Pescasa 22) exploding two mines set opposite the Pescasa dock. Three of the 5 crew members were wounded and 2 were missing.”
NYT: Stephen Kinzer, “Nicaragua, Citing Raids, Says Rebels Have New Skills” (New York Times, March 7 1984, page A3).
• February 24-25 1984—Puerto El Bluff, Zelaya Sur.
CIA: “Q-boats under the command of 3rd country nationals and manned by personnel from Central America conducted the operation. Mother craft remained in international waters. Four mines were placed in shipping channel. Four Nicaraguan patrol craft were hit: 2 were sunk and 2 were damaged. All 4 were converted fishing boats. 2 KIA [killed-in-action] and 4 WIA [wounded].”
• February 28 1984—Managua Nicaragua.
I am writing to you in order to inform you of the following serious incidents:
On 24 February 1984, at 2245 hours, one of the Piraña-type launches supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of your country to the counter-revolutionary forces operating from Honduras and Costa Rica came from Costa Rica, went as far as the Barra del Bluff sector in Zelaya department and, using rifles and heavy machine guns, attacked fuel storage facilities for 20 minutes with the intention of destroying them but without achieving its objective. ¶
In withdrawing towards Costa Rica, the launch attacked the motorized fishing vessels Aldo Chavarría and Pescasa 15 out at sea, at the level of the DICSA company facilities, causing minor physical damage. ¶
Then, in passing near the Barra de Hong Sang, it came into armed confrontation with a motor vessel of the Sandinist Navy, there being no serious outcome.
The aggressor craft also left several mines scattered over the Barra del Bluff, and at 1243 hours on 25 February the motorised vessel Pescasa 15 sank following contact with and the explosion of mines placed near the Pescasa quay. ¶
As a result of the explosion Jaime Davis and Pedro Laponte were injured.
On the same day at 1000 hours the motorised vessel Pescasa 23 was making for the quay when it came into contact with two mines, which exploded damaging the vessel. ¶
Seven persons were wounded and two disappeared.
Because of the gravity of the incidents mentioned above, the Government of Nicaragua is presenting a formal protest in the strongest terms to your Government concerning those acts, which signify a dangerous and reckless escalation in the uninterrupted aggression which your Government has been financing, organizing and directing against our country for the past two years. ¶
Those acts are in complete contradiction with the verbal declarations made by your Government in support of the Contadora process and the peace negotiations set in motion by that process. ¶
At all events, those acts amount to the imposition of a military blockade in addition to the attempts as an economic and political blockade of Nicaragua in which your Government is engaging, in open violation of international legal norms.
Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann (Nicaragua Minister for Foreign Affairs) to George P. Shultz (U.S. Secretary of State), letter dated February 28 1984, quoted in letter dated February 29 1984, from Julio Icaza Gallard (Nicaragua U.N. Ambassador Chargé d'Affaires) to the President of the U.N. Security Council (“I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present note to be circulated as a document of the Security Council”) (U.N. Doc. S/16376, February 29 1984) {75kb.pdf}.
U.N. Docs.
The U.N. document links above and below {pdf} work, but only after the U.N. server sets a session cookie. To get it, visit ODS, click Welcome, click Advanced Search, search once (Symbol: S/16376), click the search result link, to reach the “mother.asp” page. –CJHjr
• February 29–March 4 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
CIA: “Eight mines were placed in shipping channel. One Dutch dredger severely damaged. Dutch canceled dredging operation. One Soviet-class patrol boat damaged. One Cuban freighter seriously damaged.”
• March 1 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
CAHI: “The Dutch dredger Geopotes {16 kb jpg} was damaged when it struck a mine at Corinto.”
WP: “Nicaraguan Leader Charges CIA Mined Two Key Ports” (Washington Post, March 4 1984, page A19).
• March 2 1984—Washington D.C.
“On the night of February 29, [U.S. Navy Seals] emplaced four magnetic mines in the harbor at Corinto, Nicaragua. No attempt was made by the Sandinistas to engage the [Seals] during the mission. In accord with prior arrangements, ARDE’s “Barracuda Commandos” took credit for the operation.”
Oliver L. North, Constantine Menges, “Special Activities in Nicaragua,” (National Security Council, Memorandum for Robert C. McFarlane, cc: Ken DeGraffenreid, System IV, NSC/ICS-400215, N 4 4 8 4 2, March 2 1984, Top Secret) {copy, copy}.
• March 7 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
CAHI: “The Panamanian ship Los Caribes—carrying medicine, food, and industrial inputs—was severely damaged when it struck a mine at Corinto.” DGS (page 133): The cargo weighed 26 tons; the ship was entering the port when attacked by the mine. FBIS: “...the Panamanian ship North Caribe ... damaged several miles off the port on Wednesday night while preparing to leave Nicaraguan waters. No crew member was wounded ... the ship was towed ...”
FBIS: “Ship Damaged Leaving Port,” PA090033 Paris AFP in Spanish 2342 GMT 8 Mar 84 (Managua) (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, March 9 1984, page P 9). WP: AP, “Ship Said to Hit Mine in Nicaragua” (Washington Post, March 9 1984, page A25): “The ship, owned by a consortium of Central American governments, did not sink ... Meanwhile a military commander reported a helicopter and two speedboats tried to destroy oil tanks at Puerto San Juan del Sur, on Nicaragua’s southern Pacific coast, in an attack Wednesday night.” NYT: Stephen Kinzer, “Nicaraguan Port Thought to Be Mined” (New York Times, March 16 1984, page A3).
• March 8 1984—Managua Nicaragua.
I am writing to you with reference to the serious incidents described below:
On 6 March 1984, at 2200 hours, two ‘Piraña’ launches attacked military installations at Montelimar with 81 mm mortars. ¶
The first attack lasted 10 minutes, after which the launches withdrew, only to return a few minutes later for a second attack with 81 mm mortars and machine-guns. ¶
The launches withdrew again and returned once more for a third and final attack which lasted for about five minutes, after which they withdrew for good. ¶
These attacks, in which mortars mounted on fast launches were used for the first time, caused no casualties.
Yesterday, 7 March, at about 1030 hours, a tank truck loaded with 9,000 gallons of propane gas coming from Honduras was sabotaged with explosive charges characteristic of the CIA soon after it had entered Nicaraguan territory via the Tapacales frontier sector in Somoto. ¶
It should be noted that this act of sabotage occurred at a time when 200 troops of the United States armed forces and 7,200 Honduran army troops were present in the Honduran frontier sector.
Similarly, yesterday, 7 March, at 2252 hours, a fast launch, acting in concert with an attack helicopter, fired five rockets at the fuel storage tanks situated in this sector without succeeding in destroying them.
The same day, at 2300 hours, the Panamanian cargo ship Norcaribe was damaged, presumably as a result of striking a mine, while it was heading for an area near the Corinto jetty, between the third and fourth buoys. ¶
Although the causes of the explosion are still being investigated, it should be noted that the CIA mercenary forces recently announced in Costa Rica that they had mined the port of Corinto. ¶
Although the investigation is still under way, this means that we cannot rule out the possibility that the Panamanian ship may have hit a mine, which seriously damaged it.
In presenting its most formal and vigorous protest against this new escalation in the criminal attacks against economic and military objectives that endanger areas densely populated with civilians, the Government of Nicaragua expresses the firm belief that such acts form part of the new Strategy of the CIA, aimed at spreading terror in Nicaragua following the total failure of its earlier plans, and that they are intended to disrupt the process of institutionalising the Revolution and democratically strengthening Nicaragua.
Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann (Nicaragua Minister for Foreign Affairs) to George P. Shultz (U.S. Secretary of State), letter dated March 8 1984, quoted in letter dated March 9 1984 from Javier Chamorro Mora (Nicaragua U.N. Ambassador) to the President of the U.N. Security Council (“I should be grateful if you would have this note circulated as a document of the Security Council”) (U.N. Doc. S/16402, March 9 1984) {74kb.pdf}.
• March 20 1984—Puerto Sandino, León.
CAHI: “The Soviet tanker Lugansk — carrying 250,000 barrels of crude oil — was damaged by a mine in Puerto Sandino” FBIS: “as it sailed past buoy no.1 on its way into the Port of Sandino ... five Soviet sailors were injured. Two of them, Nicolai Zretiakov and Autaudil Salijazadze, had to be urgently taken to a ... hospital operating in Chinandega Department, 130 km northwest of Managua. It was announced this morning that the sailors are out of danger although one of them has spinal injuries, according to a medical report.” WP: “Today’s explosion occurred at 1:40 p.m. at the entrance to the port, Nicaraguan officials reported. Although part of the tanker caught fire, officials said it was able to reach land and unload the oil by late this afternoon.” NYT: “The Lugansk’s captain, identified by TASS as A. Anzov, was quoted as saying that the outcome would have been catastrophic had the mine not punctured a dry hold. As it was, the report said, the ‘floating magnetic mine’ buckled steel partitions between the oil tanks and damaged pipelines, the galley and emergency pumps, leaving a single fuel pump for pumping out water.” NYT: “There are not known to be any Soviet military advisers in Nicaragua. The largest concentration of Russians in the country is at Friendship Hospital in northern town of Chinandega. It was established after floods in May 1982, and has remained open ever since, still housed in tents and still staffed entirely by Soviet personnel. The Soviet seamen wounded in the mine explosion last week were taken to Chinandega for treatment before being released over the weekend ... At present, 65 Soviet doctors, nurses and technicians are believed to work there.”
FBIS: “Government Reacts to Mine Damaging Soviet Ship,” PA211911 Managua Radio Noticias in Spanish 1200 GMT 21 Mar 84 (Statement issued by the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry in Managua on 20 March) and “Blames U.S. for Explosion,” PA211642 Paris AFP in Spanish 155 GMT 21 Mar 84 (Managua) (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, March 21 1984, pages P 10-12). WP: Alma Guillermoprieto, “Mine Placed by U.S.-Backed Rebels Damages Soviet Tanker, Managua Says” (Washington Post, March 21 1984, page A19). Dusko Doder, “Soviets Blame U.S. In Tanker Blast” (Washington Post, March 22 1984, page A1). NYT: UPI, “Soviet Tanker Damaged by Mine Laid by Rebels in Nicaraguan Port” (New York Times, March 21 1984, page A4). John F. Burns, “Moscow Holds U.S. Responsible For Mines Off Nicaragua's Ports” (New York Times, March 22 1984, page A1): “... state terrorism ...” John F. Burns, “Soviet Tells Details of Sea Blast Off Nicaragua” (New York Times, March 23 1984, page A6). Stephen Kinzer, “Soviet Help to Sandinistas: No Blank Check” (New York Times, March 28 1984, page A1).
Communiqué dated 20 March 1984 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua announces the following:
At 1.40 p.m. today, the Soviet vessel Lugansk, which was carrying oil to our country, was damaged while heading past buoy No. 1 towards Puerto Sandino by an explosion caused by a device placed in that sector by mercenaries in the service of the United States Government. ¶
Five Soviet seamen were wounded as a result of that criminal action. Despite the above-mentioned terrorist action, this vessel is unloading the oil in the installations at Puerto Sandino.
This latest criminal attack is to be added to those perpetrated at Bluefields and Corinto in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans of Nicaragua, which together constitute the de facto blockade which the United States Government is applying against Nicaragua, as part of its undeclared war against the Nicaraguan people. ¶
It also once again confirms the aggressive and criminal character of the policy of State terrorism pursued by the Reagan administration in its desire to restore its domination over our country.
As well as deploring the fact that Soviet seamen, in addition to the Dutch and Central American seamen affected previously, have fallen victim to the senseless policy of the United States Government, the Government of Nicaragua denounces the danger which the indiscriminate laying of mines and explosive charges poses to international shipping along the coasts of Central America.
The Government of Nicaragua reiterates its readiness to continue to struggle for peace in the Central American area and again appeals to the international community to provide Nicaragua with the necessary technical and military means to defend itself against the State terrorism unleashed by the United States Government.
Communiqué dated 20 March 1984 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua, annexed to letter dated March 21 1984 from Javier Chamorro Mora (Nicaragua U.N. Ambassador) to the President of the U.N. Security Council (“I request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council”) (U.N. Doc. S/16426, March 21 1984) {61kb.pdf}.
• March 28 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
CAHI: “The Liberian ship Iver Chaser—carrying molasses—ran into a mine in Corinto.” FBIS: “... sailing under a Liberian flag, was leaving the Port of Corinto with 10,000 tons of molasses when it hit a mine as it was passing buoys No. 2 and No. 3.” LL: “The Liberian-registered ship had British officers and ratings and the National Union of Seamen asked UK shipowners to pay war rates on any British ship in the area. ... PAL Shipping Services, which provides manning for the Norwegian-owned vessel ....”
FBIS: “Foreign Ministry Communique” PA290050 Managua Radio Sandino Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 29 Mar 84 (Communique issued by the Nicaraguan Foreign Affairs Ministry in Managua on 28 March) (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, March 29 1984, page P 14). Lloyd’s List and Shipping Gazette, March 30 1984.
Communiqué dated 28 March 1984 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua announces the following:
Today, at 10.05 a.m., the vessel Inderchaser {Iver Chaser}, flying a Liberian flag and carrying 10,000 tons of molasses, while passing between buoys Nos. 2 and 3 on its way out of the port of Corinto, struck a mine which had been laid there, causing it to explode. ¶
The Nicaraguan authorities are still investigating the damage that was caused.
The Government of Nicaragua hereby holds the Government of the United States responsible for the human and material losses resulting from this incident. ¶
There is no doubt that such mines have been laid in Nicaraguan ports on instructions from and with the direct complicity of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States Government, which is now about to receive an additional sum of $21 million in order to continue carrying out such acts of terrorism and piracy.
This criminal act may cause new victims to be added to the toll of dead and injured of Nicaraguan, Panamanian, Soviet and Netherlands nationality who have been victims in previous incidents. ¶
The State terrorism which the United States Government is practising against Nicaragua poses a direct threat to the security of international shipping off Central American coasts and is designed to sabotage the peace efforts of the Contadora Group.
This senseless policy of the United States Administration is without any doubt the principal obstacle impeding the peace efforts of the Contadora Group and the attainment of the minimal degree of understanding and trust that would enable the work of its commissions to proceed. ¶
In the light of reality there is no alternative but to demand that the United States cease this policy in order to permit effective progress to he made in building peace.
The Government of Nicaragua confirms once again its readiness to continue to struggle for peace in the Central American region and reiterates its appeal to the international community to provide Nicaragua with the necessary technical and military means to defend itself from the State terrorism unleashed by the United States Government.
Communiqué dated 28 March 1984 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua, annexed to letter dated March 29 1984 from Javier Chamorro Mora (Nicaragua U.N. Ambassador) to the President of the U.N. Security Council (“I should be grateful if you would have the communiqué distributed as a document of the Security Council”) (U.N. Doc. S/16448, March 29 1984) {70kb.pdf}.
• March 28 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
LCC: “Later the ship Aracely Pérez—which was sweeping mines at that port—hit another mine and was also damaged.” FBIS: “... a few moments ago in Corinto. Two fishing boats owned by (ALINSA) sustained serious structural damage when they struck two explosive mines in the bay of the Port of Corinto. Despite the strong explosions, the crew members of the fishing boats San Albino and Aracely Pérez suffered no injuries. Each boat cost more than 5 million cordobas, Francisco Gonzalez, the general manager of the company reported.”
FBIS: “Mines Off Corinto” (Felix Thomas report from Corinto), PA261750 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 1705 GMT 29 Mar 84 (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, March 30 1984, page P 16). DGS, page 136.
• March 28 1984—Puerto Sandino, León.
CAHI: “The Panamanian ship Homin was attacked by Sea Raiders when it was loading 9,700 tons of sugar at Puerto Sandino.” DGS: Caused little damage. FBIS: “Official sources have reported that “Piranha”-type boats last night attacked the Panamanian-registered merchant ship Homin-7 with heavy machine-gun fire a few kilometers from the Puerto Sandino.”
FBIS: “Panamanian Ship Machine-Gunned” PA300346 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0300 GMT 30 Mar 84 (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, March 30 1984, page P 16).
• March 29 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
FBIS: “Mario Aleman, commander of the Sandinista Navy in Corinto, told newsmen that he was certain that the “piranha” speedboats which attacked that Pacific port on Tuesday “came from a vessel of large-tonnage” which was anchored 57 miles off Nicaragua’s coast ... According to Mario Aleman, Sandinist radar detected the high-tonnage vessel ...”
FBIS: “‘Piranhas’ Came From Ship” PA291901 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 132 GMT 29 Mar 84 (Managua, ACAN-EFE) (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, March 30 1984, page P 16).
• March 28-30 1984—Puerto Sandino, León.
CIA: “Eight mines placed. No tankers have visited terminal yet. Major clashes occurred during both operations: 3 Nicaraguan PB’s {patrol boats} hit; damage/casualties unknown ... On March 30, helicopter from mother boat fired defense of Q-boat which had lost both engines at offshore terminal.”
• March 29 1984—New York City.
On specific instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request a meeting of the Security Council, as a matter of urgency and immediacy, in order to consider the escalation of acts of aggression currently being perpetrated against my country.
Javier Chamorro Mora (Nicaragua U.N. Ambassador) to the President of the U.N. Security Council, letter dated March 29 1984 (U.N. Doc. S/16449, March 29 1984) {24kb.pdf}.
• March 29 1984—Managua Nicaragua.
I am writing to you, Sir, to inform you of the following facts:
On 27 March 1984, between 8.30 and 9 a.m., 30 members of the Honduran Army carried out from Honduran territory an attack by rifle fire upon a patrol of the Sandinist People's Army passing through the sector of Loma de Los Pastores, situated 1 kilometre south of Santa Tomás del Nance, in the department of Chinandega. ¶
Fortunately, the criminal attack caused no casualties.
The same day, at 11 p.m., in the naval sector of Corinto, two fast boats of the Piraña type coming from Honduras attacked Nicaraguan coast-guard vessel No. 300 while it was on patrol duty in front of the port of Corinto. ¶
At the time of the attack, two aircraft with their lights turned off overflew the zone. ¶
As a result of the criminal attack, two sailors were wounded: Sergio Hernández Sánchez, engineman on board the coast-guard vessel, who is in critical condition, and Renato Bermúdez, gunner.
Furthermore, on 28 March 1984 at 9.51 p.m. the merchant vessel Homin No. 7, of Panamanian nationality, while at Puerto Sandino, loading 9,700 tons of sugar, was attacked with 50-millimetre fire by a Piraña boat coming from Honduras. ¶
As a result of this criminal attack, the merchant vessel was hit by bullets; there was no other major damage.
Expressing its most formal and vigorous protest at the repeated acts of aggression originating in your country, the Government of Nicaragua emphasizes once more to the Government of Honduras that it is essential that the Honduran authorities should stop allowing their territory and their military resources to be used for the perpetration of such acts of provocation, acts forming part of the escalation of terror against my country which is being promoted by the present United States administration and in which the Government of Honduras is playing an increasingly important role without giving responsible thought to the dangers of a regional conflagration. ¶
At the same time, the Government of Nicaragua holds the Government of Honduras responsible for the tragic consequences that could arise out of its irresponsible and thoughtless attitude, which not only affects Nicaragua but is proving to have dangerous consequences for the merchant vessels of other Central American countries.
Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann (Nicaragua Minister for Foreign Affairs) to Edgardo Paz Barnica (Honduras Minister for Foreign Affairs), letter dated March 29 1984 from, quoted in letter dated March 29 1984 from Javier Chamorro Mora (Nicaragua U.N. Ambassador) to the President of the U.N. Security Council (“I should be grateful to you, Sir, if you would circulate this note as a Security Council document”) (U.N. Doc. S/16452, March 30 1984) {74kb.pdf}.
• March 30 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
CAHI: “The Japanese ship Terushio Maru—carrying bicycles, spare parts for cars, construction materials, and loading cotton—was damaged by a mine in Corinto.” LCC: “An explosion damaged the Japanese merchant ship Terushio as it was entering the Port of Corinto escorted by two vessels which were sweeping for mines.” FBIS: “The ship Taushiro Mahuro was entering the waters of the Bay of Corinto last night at 2204 (0404 GMT) when it was hit by an explosion between buoys No. 5 and 6.” “Yayita Sokiyaki, the ship’s first officer, said this morning that the damage is located in hold No. 3. Nevertheless, the 13,000 bales of cotton are being loaded to be taken to Japanese ports ... as part of an effort by Japanese purchasers to ensure transportation for Nicaraguan cotton.”
FBIS: “Japanese Ship Hits Mine” PA311439 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1424 GMT 31 Mar 84 (Managua, ACAN-EFE) and “Japanese Ship Loads Cargo” PA312035 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1830 GMT 31 Mar 84 (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, April 2 1984, page P 28).
• March 30 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
LCC: “The fishing boat Alma Sultana exploded an object of undetermined manufacture as it was carrying-out mine-sweeping duties between buoys 1 and 2 of the Corinto channel. The hull and other parts of the boat were damaged, and it sank completely after being towed to the dock.” FBIS: “This is a report direct from ALIMA [Alimentos Interamericanos, SA]: Today at 0800 the criminal mines placed by Ronald Reagan’s imperialists caused the explosion of a boat identified as the Alma Sultana. Four people were injured by the blast: Officer Felix Delgado, Ramon Medina, Jose Angel Jimenez, and Claudio Vasquez. The explosion occurred at buoy No. 3. This is the third ALIMA boat to be damaged in the past 3 days as a result of the mines that the CIA criminals have placed. Right now, the vessel is sinking in the waters of the Port of Corinto.”
FBIS: “Fishing Boat Hits Mine” PA301838 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 1801 GMT 30 Mar 84 (Arroliga live relay) (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, April 2 1984, pages P 26-27).
• March 30 1984—Puerto Sandino, León.
CAHI: “Three Sea Raiders and 3 helicopters attacked the Panamanian ship Homin. The ‘piranhas,’ or Sea Riders, can reach a speed of 75 miles per hour. They can be armed with M-60 machine guns or 20mm cannons in the bow, and grenade-launchers in the stern. They have room for a 3-person crew.”
FBIS: “The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry reported this afternoon that three helicopters and three ‘Piranha’ boats last night attacked the Panamanian registered ship Homin with rockets and artillery fire. The ship was loading sugar at Puerto Sandino. The Foreign Ministry added that some 10 rockets were fired but none hit the ship. It indicated that there were no reports of casualties or damage as a result of the fighting ... The Homin had already been the target of an attack from a ‘piranha’ boat on Wednesday ... The Foreign Ministry confirmed in the same communique that the Japanese ship Taushiro Mahuro had to be towed to the pier at Corinto, 150 km northwest of Managua, after it was damaged by the explosion of a mine last night.”
FBIS: “New attack on Homin’” PA312106 Paris AFP in Spanish 2025 GMT 31 Mar 84 (Managua) (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, April 2 1984, page P 28).
• March 30 1984—New York City.
41. On 28 March, the Panamanian freighter Homin No. 7 was attacked with 50-mm guns by a Piraña speedboat from Honduras. ¶
On 6.50 p.m. on that same day, the fishing boat Aracely Pérez struck a mine in Corinto and sustained serious damage to its stem.
42. On 29 March, two Piraña-type speedboats attempted to lay mines along the Pacific coast but were taken by surprise and driven off by Nicaraguan coast guard vessels, which hit one of them, setting it on fire. ... ¶
Also on the same date, two Nicaraguan fishing boats in Corinto harbour were seriously damaged after hitting two mines.
43. On 30 March — today, that is — at 5.50 a.m., there was an explosion in Corinto, between Buoys One and Two. ¶
The Nicaraguan vessel Alma Sultana, which was engaged in dredging, was seriously damaged as a result. ¶
Two reservist comrades were wounded and a member of the Sandinist People’s Army was killed.
Javier Chamorro Mora (Nicaragua U.N. Ambassador), statement, U.N. Security Council meeting 2525, official verbatim record (U.N. Doc. S/PV.2525(OR), March 30 1984, 4:35-7:30 p.m., 20 printed pages), at page 5 ¶¶ 41-43 {3076kb.pdf}.
“March 30 — The Security Council met today to hear a complaint by Nicaragua against the United States for what the Nicaraguan representative called the “criminal, cowardly war” waged against his country.
The representative, Javier Chamorro Mora, ... said that President Reagan ‘pretends to elevate himself to legislator, judge and executioner of the whole internal political life of a country and consequently acts like an international delinquent.’”
Richard Bernstein, “Nicaragua in U.N. Protest” (New York Times, March 31 1984, page A4).
• April 2 1984—New York City.
U.N. Security Council meeting 2527, official verbatim record (U.N. Doc. S/PV.2527(OR), April 2 1984, 4:15-6:20 p.m., 15 printed pages) {2314kb.pdf}.
• April 3 1984—New York City.
U.N. Security Council meeting 2528, official verbatim record (U.N. Doc. S/PV.2528andCorr.1(OR), April 3 1984, 4:35-6:45 p.m., 16 printed pages) {2482kb.pdf}.
• April 4 1984—New York City.
U.N. Security Council meeting 2529, official verbatim record (U.N. Doc. S/PV.2529(OR), April 4 1984, 4:40-8:10 p.m., 27 printed pages) {4856kb.pdf}.
“At the United Nations last night, France joined 12 other nations in approving a Security Council resolution, introduced by Nicaragua, that would have condemned mining of Nicaraguan ports.
The United States vetoed the measure ...”
Alma Guillermoprieto, “France Would Aid Managua on Mines” (Washington Post, April 6 1984, page A1).
The Security Council ...
1. Condemns and calls for an immediate end to the mining of the main ports of Nicaragua, which has caused the loss of Nicaraguan lives and injuries to nationals of other countries as well as material damage, serious disruption to its economy and the hampering of free navigation and commerce, thereby violating international law; ...
3. Reaffirms the right of Nicaragua and of all the countries of the region to live in peace and security and to determine their own future free from all foreign interference and intervention;
4. Calls on all States to refrain from carrying out, supporting or promoting any type of military action against any State of the region as well as any other action that hinders the peace objectives of the Contadora Group; ...
U.N. Security Council, draft resolution (U.N. Doc. S/16463, April 4 1984) {88kb.pdf}, vetoed by the United States, at U.N. Security Council meeting 2529, official verbatim record (U.N. Doc. S/PV.2529(OR), April 4 1984, 4:40-8:10 p.m., 27 printed pages) {4856kb.pdf}, recorded vote (page 26, ¶ 252): 13/1/1, 15 voting members, the U.K. abstaining. U.N. Security Council documents, on this topic, February-April 1984 (sorted by date, with one date error in the U.N. index).
• April 6-8 1984—Washington D.C.
“A Republican member of the Senate intelligence committee said ...
“When an American is on the mother ship in a mining operation, he’s involved directly in military activities. It’s irrelevant whether the ship is in international waters.” ...
The mines, according to the Administration officials, ... and the small, high speed boats used to place them in shipping lanes were transported to waters off Nicaragua aboard a larger vessel that serves as the nerve center for the operation. This ship, which was modified by the C.I.A. to support mining operations, carried both Americans and a unit of Latin Americans who were trained to plant mines by the United States, according to the Administration officials.”
Philip Taubman, “Americans On Ship Said To Supervise Nicaragua Mining” (New York Times, April 8 1984, page A1). Fred Hiatt, Joanne Omang, “CIA Helped To Mine Ports In Nicaragua” (Washington Post, April 7 1984, page A1). David Rogers, “U.S. Role In Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Reportedly Is Larger Than First Thought” (Wall Street Journal, April 6 1984, page A9).
• April 6 1984—New York City:
Perez de Cuellar,
Secretary General
United Nations
April 6 1984
Excellency:
I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States of America to refer to the Declaration of my Government of August 2 1946, concerning the acceptance by the United States of America of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and to state that the aforesaid Declaration shall not apply to disputes with any Central American state or arising our of or related to events in Central America, any of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties to them may agree.
Notwithstanding the terms of the aforesaid Declaration, this provision shall take effect immediately and shall remain in force for two years, so as to foster the continuing regional dispute settlement process which seeks a negotiated solution in the interrelated political, economic and security problems of Central America.
1354 U.N.T.S. 452 (April 6 1984) {U.N. Doc.: ST/LEG(05)/U5, ISSN: 0379-8267, LCCN: 48022417, OCLC: 1768015, WorldCat},
reprinted, 23 I.L.M. 670 (May 1984) {Lexis} {International Legal Materials, ISSN: 0020-7829, LCCN: 67005225, OCLC: 1753623, WorldCat},
reprinted, The Mining of Nicaraguan Ports and Harbors: Hearing and Markup ... on H. Con. Res. H290, page 55 (U.S. Congress 98-2, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing, April 11 1984) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/1:M 66, CIS: 84 H381-70, LCCN: 84603420, OCLC: 11094131, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat},
reprinted, Yearbook 1984-1985, page 100 (U.N. I.C.J.: International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands) {U.N. Sales Number: ICJ515 (all), ISSN: 0074-445X, ditto, ISBN: 9211700396, LCCN: 48001594, OCLC: 1714864, WorldCat},
quoted in, Nicaragua v. United States (“Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua”), filed April 9 1984, judgment (jurisdiction and admissibility) November 26 1984, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 545 (separate opinion of Judge Robert Jennings {2.2mb.pdf}) (U.N. I.C.J.: International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands).
Secretary of State George P. Shultz was questioned about the mining of Nicaraguan harbors during a luncheon meeting Thursday with reporters and editors of The Washington Post.
Asked whether Washington has any control over the mining operations, Shultz said,
“I don’t have any comment to make about that.”
Fred Hiatt, Joanne Omang, “CIA Helped To Mine Ports In Nicaragua” (Washington Post, April 7 1984, page A1).
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger ... declined to deny the reports of U.S. involvement in mining the harbors. ...
The secretary also said,
“The United States is not mining the harbors of Nicaragua.”
But when asked whether his denial included CIA activities, he retreated.
“Well, I’m not talking about anything the CIA is doing or not doing,”
Weinberger said.
Don Oberdorfer, Fred Hiatt, “U.S. to Bar Latin Role For Court” (Washington Post, April 9 1984, page A1).
• April 8 1984—Washington D.C.
“April 8 — The Reagan Administration announced today that it would not accept World Court jurisdiction in disputes involving Central America for the next two years. ...
A senior State Department official said the move, which was unexpected, had been made because of information that Nicaragua was about to bring charges against the United States in the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the official name for the World Court.
He said that confidential intelligence reports received last week, as well as some other public signs, led the Administration to conclude that Nicaragua was planning to go to the World Court in coming days. ...
“We had to do it very rapidly,” the official said today. “If they filed before we moved, we’d be stuck.” ...
A formal notification was given to the United Nations late last Friday, the official said.”
Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Voids Role Of World Court On Latin Policy” (New York Times, April 9 1984, page A1). Don Oberdorfer, Fred Hiatt, “U.S. to Bar Latin Role For Court” (Washington Post, April 9 1984, page A1). David Rogers, “Reagan Snubs World Court Over Nicaragua” (Wall Street Journal, April 9 1984, page A9).
• April 9 1984—The Hague, Netherlands:
Nicaragua v. United States (“Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua”), filed, April 9 1984 (“Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures”) (U.N. I.C.J.: International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands) {204kb.pdf, source}, announced, “Nicaragua Institutes Proceedings Against the United States of America” (I.C.J., Communiqué, No. 84/10, April 9 1984) {170kb.pdf, source, source}.
Stuart Taylor Jr., “Nicaragua Takes Case Against U.S. To World Court” (New York Times, April 10 1984, page A1).
• April 10 1984—Washington D.C.:
Barry M. Goldwater: This afternoon, CIA Director Casey appeared before my committee, in closed session, to brief us on this issue.
I learned, to my deep regret, that the President did approve this mining program.
And, that he approved it almost 2 months ago.
Furthermore, I learned that—
In spite of the legal requirement, that the intelligence family keep the members of our committee fully and currently informed on this sort of matter—
We had not been so informed.
By contrast, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had been fully briefed on this matter several weeks ago.
Barry M. Goldwater (Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence), statement during a Senate debate (beginning 6:30 p.m.) on Senate Amendment 2905, to cut off funding for mining Nicaragua’s ports and waters, “Miscellaneous Tariff, Trade and Customs Matters, Federal Boat Safety Act Amendment,”
130 Congressional Record 8530-8544 (debate), 8536-8537 (Goldwater), at 8537 (April 10 1984, permanent edition, U.S. Congress 98-2) {SuDoc: X.98/2:130/PT.6}
(daily edition, pages S4192-S4205, at S4198) {SuDoc: X/A.98/2:130/???}.
• April 12 1984—Washington D.C.:
Edward P. Boland: Well, simply—
We found out about the mining on January 31 1984.
And on that day, the committee was briefed.
Indicating that a harbor was mined.
Puerto Sandino, on the Pacific side of Nicaragua. ...
And that information came to us after the harbor was mined.
The remainder of the mining took place in February. ...
Where did the equipment come from?
Where did the mines come from?
Who got on the small boats?
And where did the small boats come from?
The small boats came from a mother ship.
That was lying in international waters.
Manned by people paid by the CIA.
Edward P. Boland (Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence), statement during House debate (about 6:30-11:30 p.m.), “Providing for Consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 290, Expressing Sense of Congress That No Appropriated Funds Shall Be Used for the Purpose of Mining the Ports or Territorial Waters of Nicaragua,”
130 Congressional Record 9470-9513, at 9510 (April 12 1984, permanent edition, U.S. Congress 98-2) {SuDoc: X.98/2:130/PT.7}
(daily edition, pages H2878-H2921, at H2918) {SuDoc: X/A.98/2:130/???}.
• April 9-12 1984—Washington D.C.:
It is the sense of the Congress that no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated in any Act of Congress shall be obligated or expended for the purpose of planning, directing, executing, or supporting the mining of the ports or territorial waters of Nicaragua.
U.S. Public Law No. 98-369, Title IX – Miscellaneous Provisions (U.S. Congress 98-2, July 18 1984), 98 Stat. 494, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note.
Source: S. Amdt. 2905, introduced April 9, adopted April 10, 1984, 1984, Senate roll call vote 98-2:59 (84/12/4), 130 Congressional Record 8543-8544 (permanent edition) (daily edition, page S4205);
H.J. Res. 539, introduced April 9 1984, referred to committee;
H. Con. Res. 290, introduced April 11, adopted April 12, 1984, House roll call vote 98-2:90 (281/111/41), 130 Congressional Record 9513 (permanent edition) (daily edition, pages H2920-H2921).
• May 2 1984—Puerto Corinto, Chinandega.
LCC: “The state-owned fishing vessel Pedro Arauz Palacios was destroyed by a mine in the Puerto Corinto access channel.”
• May 10 1984—The Hague, Netherlands:
41. For these reasons,
The Court,
A. Unanimously,
Rejects the request by the United States of America that the proceedings ... be terminated ...
B. Indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings ... the following provisional measures:
1. Unanimously,
The United States of America should immediately cease and refrain from any action restricting, blocking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines;
• Nicaragua v. United States (“Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua”), filed, April 9 1984, order, May 10 1984 (“Provisional Measures”), 1984 I.C.J. 169, 186-187 ¶ 41 (U.N. I.C.J.: International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands) {2.3mb.pdf, source, press release: 512kb.pdf, source}.
• June 30 1984—Puerto Sandino, León.
FBIS: “Joaquin Cuadra, deputy defense minister and chief of staff of the Sandinist People’s Army, has denounced the explosion of a mine yesterday morning at 0700 in the port of Puerto Sandino. ... [Begin Cuadra recording] ... in the port of Puerto Sandino, another mine placed by the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism exploded at 0700 ... to pressure the revolution and blackmail us by placing mines in our principal ports.”
FBIS: “Cuadra Charges U.S. with Puerto Sandino Explosion” PA011515 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1300 GMT 1 Jul 84 (FBIS, Latin America, Central America, July 2 1984, pages P 20-21). DGS, page 165.
