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“Terrorism” v. military attack
(targeting a military objective, during a war)
U.S. Marine Corps barracks bombing (Beirut, October 23 1983):
Judicial theft?
by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
I’ve just discovered (on Dec. 5 2003) that a U.S. District Court Judge has entered default judgments, followed by judgments on the merits, against Iran, for the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut on October 23 1983. And that damage awards are pending.
I haven’t yet read the Judge’s opinion, and there’s a lot of paper work in the two cases which is not available on the internet. And so I don’t yet know what the plaintiffs’s lawyers brought to the Judge’s attention. And what the plaintiffs’s lawyers did not bring to his attention.
But this I do know:
The United States of America, prior to that bombing — in secret from the U.S. public and the U.S. Congress — entered that complex multi-party civil and international war as a Belligerent, conducting offensive military operations directly, and also via tactical military support to another Belligerent.
And what does this mean?
This means that any other Belligerent in that war was lawfully entitled to attack the U.S. Marine Corps barracks as a lawful military operation during a war.
This was not the picture painted for the American public by U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan who described that bombing, and the simultaneous bombing of the French Military Headquarters, as “heinous acts of international terrorism” (Oct. 23 1983) {copy}, 1983 PPPUS 1499, and “acts of terrorism ... vicious, cowardly, and ruthless ... international criminals and thugs” (Oct. 24 1983) {copy}, 1983 PPPUS 1500-1505 at 1501.
The Court is not prepared to read out of the Constitution the clause granting to the Congress, and to it alone, the authority “to declare war”.
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C., Dec. 13 1990)
Reagan constructed his rhetorical bluster to conceal the truth, because he had previously, in secret, violated his oath of office and the U.S. Constitution and ordered U.S. Military forces into an offensive war without the consent of Congress and in violation of his promise to Congress: “the American force will not engage in combat” (Sept. 29 1982), 1982 PPPUS 1238 {ucsb}.
And this was not the first time, nor the last time, he launched violent attacks in violation of the U.S. Constitution, and lied about it.
All powerful empires, throughout history, have labeled valiant warriors who oppose them in the field: “terrorists, criminals, and thugs.”
Reagan and his Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, in secret, issued a National Command Authority Order on September 11 1983 — 6 weeks before the bombing — authorizing acts of offensive warfare in Lebanon’s civil and international war. U.S. Military commanders — knowing that the U.S. Congress had not consented to this offensive warfare — violated their oath of office and obeyed this unlawful order, immediately commencing offensive acts of war in direct military operations, independently and also in support of another Belligerent. These same U.S. Military commanders had previously done the same by resupplying ammunition to a Belligerent in the field, a tactical military operation, an act of war.
Did the Judge take these facts into account, when awarding a default judgment against Iran to the plaintiffs seeking damages for the Marine Corps barracks bombing six week later?
Any order, awarding plaintiffs money belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the legal theory that the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut was an unlawful act — without taking first into account the status of the United States of America as a prima facie Belligerent in that civil and international war — would constitute theft.
And if the Judge were aware of these prima facie facts, and their likely relevance to the issues before him, and decided to ignore them and issue an order anyway — without a considered inquiry into the existence of these facts and their legal significance — that Judge would thereby exhibit prima facie criminal intent to commit theft. Such is the way I look at it at the moment.
The plaintiffs in these cases have experienced personal loss and their grief is justified and understandable. Such are the fortunes of war.
But if they also feel anger, then I suggest they direct their anger where it belongs: To Ronald W. Reagan and his corrupt circle who decided to commit their loved ones into an offensive war in secret from Congress and in violation of the U.S. Constitution; to the corrupt U.S. Military commanders who decided to disobey their oath and obey that unlawful order; and to other U.S. Military commanders who may have neglected to properly plan for force protection.
But don’t bother trying to sue any of these people. Or the United States of America. Because the U.S. Congress licenses the U.S. Military to commit crimes and torts free of accountability in any U.S. Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (Federal Tort Claims Act, “combatant activities” exception). U.S. Judges are handy at handing out money belonging to foreign nations, but their hands are tied when anyone asks for money belonging to the United States of America.
These cases also involve two other events:
The bombing of the U.S. embassy on April 18 1983. And this I’ll have to investigate. In addition to the above events, the U.S., prior to the bombing of the U.S. embassy, was providing military training to a Belligerent and likely tactical military intelligence from the CIA/DIA/NSA Stations in the U.S. embassy in Beirut and perhaps other tactical military support.
In addition, the CIA Chief of Station in Beruit was William Buckley, from the CIA/DoD Phoenix Program in Vietnam. He was in charge of counter-terrorism, and that usually means violent crime. Command and control of violent crime, and acts of war, from CIA Stations located in U.S. embassys constitutes U.S. embassys a prima facie lawful military target.
Following the Marine Corps barracks bombing, for example, the CIA organized it, incited it, funded their operations generally, its operatives, according to Bob Woodward and Jim Hougan, the car-bomb murder in Beirut on March 8 1985, targeting Shiite Muslim leader Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. He escaped harm, but the bomb killed 80 innocent people, wounding 175 or more.
The third event, was the 4-day “kidnap” of a U.S. citizen and his torture. He suffered from a very unusual bowl condition, unknown to the kidnappers, due to scar tissue from a previous surgery, which was destined to kill him if he did not receive medical attention. Torture is unlawful. But the “kidnap” was not unlawful, on the face of the circumstances. Those taking custody of the U.S. citizen were the armed forces of Belligerents in a war, and they suspected the U.S. citizen of being a spy for Israel (another Belligerent in that complex war). It’s perfectly lawful for a Belligerent to arrest such a suspect during a war — as the U.S. itself regularly does — and such a lawful arrest is not “kidnapping”. Unlike the U.S., however, these armed forces did not convey their prisoner to Cuba and hold him in solitary confinement for two years: They took him to the hospital and released him on the 4th day. I’ve only glanced at these facts and I haven’t yet read the Judge’s opinion and so I’ll return to this topic when I do.
There are other things I’m doing. So until I can organize a fuller explanation and documentation of these events, here are excerpts from two U.S. Government documents, documenting the legal status of the United States of America as a Belligerent in that war, 6 weeks before the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks.
First, the DoD Report and then a U.S. Congress Committee report:
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• Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (December 20 1983) {5mb.pdf, source} {SuDoc: D 1.2:B 39, LCCN: 84601507, OCLC: 10270249, 14007440, GPOCat, WorldCat}:
Part One — The Military Mission
{Pages 40-41} On 19 September, following a National Command Authority (NCA) decision {U.S. President and Secretary of Defense}, Naval gunfire support was employed to support the LAF {Lebanese Armed Forces} fighting at Suq-Al-Gharb. ...
The image of the USMNF {U.S., Multinational Force}, in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim. After the USMNF engaged in direct fire support of the LAF, a significant portion of the Lebanese populace no longer considered the USMNF a neutral force.
* * *
{Page 42} In August and September 1983, the U.S. resupplied the LAF with ammunition. The LAF were engaged in intense fighting against the Druze and various Syrian surrogates. The ammunition came from MAU {24th Marine Amphibious Unit}, CONUS {Continental United States} and USCINCEUR {Commander in Chief, United States European Command} stocks, and was delivered by Military Sealift Command, Mobile Logistic Support Force (CTF 63), and CTF 61 ships. {CTF: Combined Task Force}
On 19 September 1983, naval gunfire was employed in direct support of the LAF at Suq-Al-Gharb.
Following the U.S. action in providing Naval gunfire support for the LAF at Suq-Al-Gharb, hostile acts against the USMNF increased and the Marines began taking significantly more casualties. A direct cause and effect linkage between Suq-Al-Gharb and the terrorist bombing {alias: a prima facie lawful military action} on 23 October 1983, cannot be determined. ... The prevalent view within the USCINCEUR chain of command, however, is that there was some linkage between the two events. Whether or not there was a direct connection between Suq-Al-Gharb and the increase in terrorist attacks on the USMNF, the public statements of factional leaders confirmed that a portion the Lebanese populace no longer considered the USMNF neutral.
* * *
Part Two — Rules of Engagement
{Page 46} When defeat of the LAF {Lebanese Armed Forces} appeared imminent, the National Command Authorities (NCA) {U.S. President and Secretary of Defense} authorized the use of naval gunfire and tactical air strikes in support of the LAF at Suq-Al-Gharb. Occupation of the dominant terrain in the vicinity of Suq-Al-Gharb by hostile forces would pose a danger to USMNF positions at BIA. Direct support of the LAF in those circumstances was to be considered {by whom? 1 } as an act of self-defense authorized by the existing ROE {Rules of Engagement}. Early on 12 September 1983, the acting CJCS {Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: John W. Vessey Jr., General, U.S. Army} notified USCINCEUR {Commander in Chief, United States European Command: Bernard Rogers, General, U.S. Army} of that decision. Later that day, USCINCEUR directed CINCUSNAVEUR {Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe} to inform his subordinate commands to provide fire support to the LAF when the U.S. ground commander (CTF 62) determined that Suq-Al-Gharb was in danger of falling to an attack by non-Lebanese forces. USCINCEUR directed in the same message, “Nothing in this message shall be construed as changing the mission or ROE for USMNF.”
1 This is an unlawful order to obey an unlawful order: An order that U.S. military commanders must disregard the fact that the National Command Authority order is unlawful on its face, authorizing offensive warfare without consent of Congress, and in repudiation of the President’s promise to Congress: “the American force will not engage in combat” {copy}, 1982 PPPUS 1238 (quoted).
Sadly, those on the receiving end of U.S. military offensive warfare are legally entitled to form their own opinion, and to act on their opinion, whether this offensive warfare constitutes the United States of America to be a Belligerent in their war, as it plainly does. We judge people by what they do, not by what they say, and not by what they write down in their secret, self-serving, orders.
–CJHjr
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• Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut (“Report, together with additional and dissenting views”) (U.S. Congress 98-1, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee Print No. 11, December 19 1983) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/2:M 33/4, CIS: 83 H202-21, LCCN: 84601742, OCLC: 10308860, 14007440, GPOCat, WorldCat}:
{Pages 28-29} The latest, and perhaps the most significant, change was the use of naval gunfire in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the September fighting at Suq el-Gharb. That gunfire broke up the attack, but it reinforced the Moslems’ belief that the United States had moved even further from impartial peacekeeper to Christian supporter. Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, commander of the marines in Beirut from May to November 1983 {CTF-62}, testified,
“The support that was provided at Suq el-Gharb was, in my opinion, a departure from our neutral peacekeeping role to direct support of the Lebanese Armed Forces.”
The subcommittee also learned that Colonel Geraghty had strongly opposed the administration’s proposal to change the Rules of Engagement to allow the shelling at Suq el-Gharb. Captain Morgan France, commander of the task force of ships off Beirut {CTF-61}, regarded this authority to support the Lebanese Armed Forces as a change of mission. He said:
“We felt the naval gunfire in defense of the mission ashore was a sound, tactical move, but naval gunfire in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces was a definite change of mission and, of course, one of the things we had emphasized all the way through there was maintaining our neutral presence, and this meant especially regarding the civil war in Lebanon because the marines were surrounded by the Shia.”
On September 19, after a period in which U.S. ships fired when U.S. position were attacked, USS Virginia (CGN 38) and USS John Rogers (DD 983) fired 338 rounds from their 5-inch guns in support of Lebanese Army forces defending the strategically important village of Sug el Gharb in the Shouf Mountains east of Beirut. This signaled a shift in U.S. policy, and on 25 September, New Jersey took up station off Beirut.
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Other documents:
• Situation in Lebanon (U.S. Congress 98-1, Senate Hearing S.Hrg. 98-612, Senate Armed Services Committee, October 25, 31, 1983) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.98-612, CIS: 84 S201-22, LCCN: 84602421, OCLC: 10699318, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, witnesses: Caspar W. Weinberger (U.S. Secretary of Defense), Paul X. Kelley (Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps).
• Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for Improving that Security (U.S. Congress 98-1, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee Serial H.A.S.C. No. 98-58, hearings, November 1, 2, 13, December 8, 9, 14, 15, 1983) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/2 A:983-84/58, CIS: 85 H201-26, LCCN: 85602728, OCLC: 12427963, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.
• Situation in Lebanon and Grenada (“Department of Defense Appropriations: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session / Subcommittee on Department of Defense”) (U.S. Congress 98-1, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, hearing, November 8 1983) {SuDoc: Y 4.AP 6/1:D 36/10, CIS: 84 H181-1, LCCN: 84601544, OCLC: 10407941, 10346009, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, witnesses: Caspar W. Weinberger (U.S. Secretary of Defense), Paul X. Kelley (Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps).
• Full Committee Consideration of Investigations Subcommittee Report on Terrorist Bombing at Beirut International Airport (U.S. Congress 98-2, House Armed Services Committee, Committee Serial H.A.S.C. No. 98-36, hearings, January 31 1984) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/2 A:983-84/36, CIS: 84 H201-28, LCCN: 84603322, OCLC: 11087525, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.
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Cases
• Deborah D. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran (D.D.C., 01-CV-2094, filed Oct. 3 2001, default judgment Dec. 18 2002, merits judgment May 30 2003, damage awards pending) (Marine Corps barracks bombing, Oct. 23 1983)
• Joseph Boulos v. Islamic Republic of Iran (D.D.C., 01-CV-2684, filed Dec. 28 2001, default judgment Dec. 18 2002, merits judgment May 30 2003, damage awards pending) (Marine Corps barracks bombing, Oct. 23 1983)
• Anne Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (D.D.C., 01-CV-2224, filed Oct. 29 2001, default judgment Sept. 6 2002, merits judgment Sept. 8 2003, damage awards pending) (U.S. embassy bombing, April 18 1983)
• John R. Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (D.D.C., 99-CV-2890, filed Oct. 29 1999, default judgment Dec. 1 2000, damage awards Dec. 18 2002) (kidnapping and torture, Nov. 16-20 1984)
By CJHjr: Formatted (xhtml/css), links, text {in braces}, bold-face, bold-italics, highlighting, text in yellow boxes.
This document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied. U.S. Government documents are not copyrighted.
CJHjrCharles Judson Harwood Jr.
Posted Dec. 6 2003. Updated Nov. 24 2011.
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/beirut-1980s.html