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Bancoult v. McNamara (D.D.C., No. 01-CV-2629, filed Dec. 20 2001)

See also, Federal Tort Claims Act, Other defenses and issues

Alien Tort Claims Act

by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

There’s another Courthouse door, of ancient origin, not defended by jeering U.S. Government lawyers, sneering U.S. Government officials, and dismissive U.S. Judges, who slam the courthouse door on the approach of foreign victims of wrongdoing by the United States, and thereby preserve freedom — freedom for the U.S. Government to wage crimes and torts abroad.

This other door was installed by a Congress of a different era — the first Congress, in its first session, in 1789, when the U.S. was not a superpower — and it was long forgotten, until 1980 (Filartiga). It’s a door built especially for foreigners. And — as it wasn’t crafted to deny justice, but to enable justice — it’s plain and simple and it’s not decorated with exceptions:

“Sec. 1350. — Alien’s action for tort

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”

Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, codifying Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9 (Sept. 24 1789), 1 Stat. 73, 77 {100kb.html/gif}, § 9(b), bold-face added.

This is an important law and the probable reason it was adopted — because this was on their minds at the time, and discussed among them — is that foreign nations would be entitled under international law to attack the United States if the United States harbors wrongdoers within its borders and provides no peaceable remedy to the foreign victims to obtain justice. Hence, we see lawsuits today against U.S. oil companies and others for their foreign crimes and torts.

Under this provision, U.S. Courts can apply their full-range of remedies to any wrongdoing they find: actual damages, punitive damages, injunctions, declaratory judgments.

Foreigners (‘aliens’), both resident and non-resident, can sue in U.S. Courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act. They can sue individuals and businesses, both U.S. residents and foreigners, but no longer foreign governments.

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (Jan. 23 1989) (the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act  “is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts”).


But can they sue the United States under the ATCA?

In the Chagos case, we have aliens (the Chagos islanders) bringing a civil action for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations (deportation/exile). These being the jurisdictional elements of the ATCA, the U.S. Court plainly has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear their complaint, despite the fight under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

This provision is (presumably) the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction to hear their complaint against the individual U.S. defendants who are responsible for the crimes and torts against them, including present-day U.S. officials who continue to enforce the unlawful deportations. Ditto, the corporate defendants Haliburton Corporation and its subsidiary Brown & Root, Inc.

Yet, it’s no help to the Chagos islanders in their suit against the United States for money damages, at least as U.S. law now stands. This ATCA is fraught by the same issue plaguing the previous discussion, about the FTCA, namely: the determined refusal of the United States to permit itself to be sued for money damages for its wrongdoings, except for the bits and pieces Congress consents to (‘sovereign immunity’). The ATCA does not constitute such a waiver. That waiver must be found elsewhere and, as for money damages for torts, that elsewhere is the FTCA, guarded by its exceptions, and bound to U.S. State tort law, as explained here: Federal Tort Claims Act.

In theory, however, the U.S. Court could award money damages against the United States (having secured jurisdiction under this ATCA), without a waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress. This, as a remedy fashioned under the direct authority of the Constitution to hold the U.S. Government accountable under the rule-of-law, for its criminal torts, in defense of the U.S. Constitution — that the U.S. be a nation of laws and not of criminals. Like the damage remedy the U.S. Supreme Court created against individual U.S. Government employees, for their unlawful behavior, in Bivens.

The U.S. Congress will not permit a foreign nation to hide behind sovereign immunity to evade money damage accountability for the international crimes of its officials (Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act). So too U.S. Courts should not permit the United States itself to hide behind sovereign immunity to evade money damage accountability for the international crimes of its officials.

But the present U.S. Supreme Court won’t do this; only Congress, they would certainly say (with some possible dissenters), has the authority to submit the U.S. to the rule-of-law and to accountability in U.S. Courts, even for international crimes which Congress may itself even be complicit in.


There’s more to life than money damages. There’s injustice. And people who have been mistreated want public recognition and public agreement that what was done to them was unjust, and unlawful, and wrong. And, for this, the Alien Tort Claims Act provides ostensible jurisdiction to the U.S. Court to issue such a declaratory judgment, against the U.S. Government, saying precisely these things about the mistreatment by the U.S. Government of the Chagos islanders.

And such a declaratory judgment could put an end to their damages for the future:  It would mean the U.S. and U.K. — if they wish to maintain the status quo — must purchase from the islanders, in a free and fair commercial bargain, their right to return to their homeland island of Diego Garcia. What the law required them to do in the first place. This, in addition to their past damages, if the U.S. Court will also accept jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

As well, such an authoritative declaration would attract media attention and, conceivably, it could even prompt Congress to pay their past damages, and purchase money, even if the Judge decides that Congress has denied him jurisdiction to award them damages himself and the U.S./U.K. refuse to honor the declaratory judgment or any injunction the Judge might issue requiring purchase money negotiations.

“Sec. 2201. — Creation of remedy

(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except ..., any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, excerpt, bold-face and highlighting added.

For this remedy against the United States, as with money damages, Congress must first waive the sovereign immunity of the United States. And, for “relief other than money damages” against the United States (and this includes a declaratory judgment), Congress did this, in 1976:

“Sec. 702. — Right of review

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States: Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance.”

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, excerpt, bold-face and highlighting added; amendment waiving sovereign immunity effective Oct. 21 1976.


The U.S. Government lawyers would oppose this relief, because it presupposes a trial on the merits which would create an authoritative, documentary, detailed, historical record of the wrongdoing by the U.S. Government, and naming names of the U.S. officials responsible. And, because it would require U.S. officials to negotiate with a group of noboby islanders– a spectacle.

Thus, U.S. Government lawyers might claim: (a) the U.S. Court has no ‘jurisdiction’ to grant this relief, (b) the Chagos islanders have no ‘standing’ to complain about the wrong done to them by the U.S. Government, (c) there’s no ‘case or controversy’ if the Judge finds he has no jurisdiction to award them money damages (U.S. Courts have no authority to issue advisory opinions on abstract questions), and (d) the ‘act of state’ doctrine blocks their complaint.


A U.S. trial court has held: “The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity under the ATCA”, and thus the Court had no jurisdiction to consider a complaint against the United States under Alien Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1350).

In that case, the plaintiffs (alien asylum seekers and detainees) were suing for “cruel, unhuman or degrading treatment” by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, a large number of individual officials, and Correctional Services Corporation, a non-governmental corporation operating their detention facility {22 F.Supp.2d 353, 364}:

“The INS moves to dismiss the ATCA claims against it because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to that statute. Absent a specific waiver of such immunity the United States and its agencies are immune from suit and courts lack jurisdiction over them. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474-75 (1994).

Plaintiffs argue that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) read in conjunction with the ATCA constitutes the requisite waiver of sovereign immunity. The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. It provides in relevant part:

Each State party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms herein recognized are violated shall have an effective {22 F.Supp.2d 353, 365} remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) to ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities.

ICCPR Article 2(3) (a-b).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16 1966, March 23 1976) {U.N. Doc.: ST/LEG(05)/U5, ISSN: 0379-8267, LCCN: 48022417, WorldCat}. Status (MTDSG) {U.N. Doc.: ST/LEG/SER.E/, ISSN: 0082-8319, LCCN: 48022417, WorldCat}. U.S. Senate Treaty No. 95-20; President Jimmy Carter transmitted, “Human Rights Treaties, Message to the Senate,” 1978 PPPUS 395-396 {ucsb} (Feb. 23 1978) {SuDoc: GS 4.113:978/BK.1, ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, DL, LFDL, WorldCat}; Senate Executive Document No. 95/2-E (Feb. 23 1978), part of, Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, message from the President of the United States {SuDoc: Y 1.95/2:C-F/corr, Serial Set 95-2: omitted (“Senate executive documents and reports were not included in the Serial Set until 1980”), CIS: 78 S385-3, LCCN: 78601565, GPOCat, LL: paper, UC, WorldCat}; Senate Hearing 102-478 (Nov. 21 1991) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.Hrg.102-478, CIS: 92 S381-25, LCCN: 92191239, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche); Senate Executive Report No. 102-23 (March 24 1992) {63kb.txt, 302kb.pdf} {SuDoc: Y 1.1/6:102-23, Serial Set 102-2: 14102, CIS: 92 S384-1, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche}; Senate consent, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-4784 {pf} (April 2 1992, daily edition 138/49) {SuDoc: X/A.102/2:138/49, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, WorldCat}; U.S. ratified: June 8 1992, effective Sept. 8 1992, 1676 U.N.T.S. 543, accord, T.I.F. {185kb.pdf} {SuDoc: S 9.14:2004, ISSN: 0083-0194, LCCN: 56061604, DL}CJHjr

Upon ratification of the ICCPR, the Senate attached a ‘declaration{13 kb} (as opposed to a ‘reservation’ entered for articles 7 and 15). The declaration stated that the provisions of Article 2 cited above are not self-executing, 138 Cong. Rec. S4783, at S4784 (Daily ed. April 2, 1992). ‘Non-self executing’ means that absent any further actions by the Congress to incorporate them into domestic law, the courts may not enforce them...

The intent to waive sovereign immunity must be expressed in clear, unambiguous language. It is difficult to discern an unambiguous waiver (or even an ambiguous waiver) when the Senate ratified the ICCPR, stated that it was not self-executing and made no mention of the 200 year old ATCA.

The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity under the ATCA. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092, (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (holding that even if customary international law may be applied to foreign sovereigns under the ATCA as interpreted in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), it cannot be applied to the United States, as there is no waiver of immunity). The ATCA, in providing jurisdiction and a right of action under the law of nations, does nothing to displace sovereign immunity, and plaintiffs’ claims against the INS based on the ATCA must be dismissed.”

Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 22 F.Supp.2d 353, 364-365 (D.N.J. No. 97-3093 Oct. 1 1998, Judge: Dickinson Richards Debevoise), not appealed, bold-face, links, highlighting, and text {in braces} added, parallel citations omitted.

Either the Judge doesn’t understand this subject, or else I don’t. But if it’s the Judge, then he’s got company {1976 USCCAN 6145}:

“No one can read the significant Supreme Court cases on sovereign immunity ... without concluding that the field is a mass of confusion; and if he ventures beyond that to attempt some reconciliation of the courts of appeals decisions, he will find confusion compounded.”

Antonin Scalia (Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice), letter dated May 10 1976 to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, pertaining to to the ensuing P.L. 94-574, amending the Administrative Procedure Act to waive sovereign immunity for “relief other than money damages”, 5 U.S.C. § 702, Oct. 21 1976 (U.S. Congress 94-2, House Judiciary Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, Sept. 22 1976, SuDoc 94-2:H.rp.1656, Serial Set: 13134-12), 1976 USCCAN 6121, 6145, via 1976 WestLaw 14066, Leg.Hist. (103 kb), bold-face added.

The U.S. Supreme Court has admitted its confusion and confessed (below) that it made the very same mistake the Judge did in the Jama case. Recovering partially from their confusion, the Supreme Court indicated that sovereign immunity pertains to a remedy and not to a claim (a ‘cause of action’). The ATCA provides no remedy, merely (as the Judge correctly observed) subject-matter jurisdiction, and so it’s little wonder (as the Judge puts it) that: “The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity under the ATCA” (there being no remedy in that statute, there’s nothing there to waive).

Sovereign immunity requires an analysis of each particular remedy the plaintiff-victim seeks. In the Jama case {22 F.Supp.2d 353, 360}:

“The complaint requests money damages, costs, and a declaratory judgment that defendants have violated the numerous laws under which the action is brought” 22 F.Supp.2d at 360.

In 1976, the entire United States Congress — not just the Senate — waived the sovereign immunity of the United States “in clear, unambiguous language” (as the Judge desires) as to the remedy of declaratory judgment, which the Jama plaintiffs sought against the United States, and which the Chagos islanders now seek as well. Congress enacted this waiver in an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 702), as detailed above.

The Senate does not have legal authority to unilaterally repeal this Act of Congress by a statement in the Congressional Record. Ratifying a treaty is a legislative act of Congress, even though the House is not involved, that’s true. But, a decision to repeal a waiver enacted by both Houses of Congress surely must be expressed by the same “clear, unambiguous language” as the original waiver must be. And more than that, it surely requires the consent of the House, because it’s Congress which controls sovereign immunity, not the Senate acting alone. In other words: any purported repeals by the Senate, acting alone, via treaty-ratifications, are not self-executing. And (in the words of the Judge): “‘Non-self executing’ means that absent any further actions by the Congress to incorporate them into domestic law, the courts may not enforce them” (bold-face added).

But far from purporting to repeal existing law in a devious, and doubious, manner, via a treaty ratification, the Senate indeed disclaimed any such intention, by emphasizing that existing federal law (which the treaty deals with) continues in force, unaffected by its legislative action in ratifying the treaty (with the usual U.S. strings attached):

“The overwhelming majority of the provisions in the Covenant are compatible with existing U.S. domestic law. In those few areas where the two diverge, the Administration has proposed a reservation or other form of condition to clarify the nature of the obligation being undertaken by the United States.”

And, if existing federal law already provided for a cause of action (eg: a U.S./international tort-law claim), and a remedy (eg: a declaratory judgment), then the new treaty did not create either (because they already existed). And, moreover, the Senate contemplated that both the existing cause of action, and the existing remedy, would continue to be available to victim-plaintiffs:

“For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing. The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts. As was the case with the Torture Convention, existing U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated.”

Ratification of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights {10kb.txt, 302kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 102-2, Senate Executive Report No. 102-23, March 24 1992), bold-face added. Senate Resolution (April 2 1992), ratifying the ICCPR treaty {cited above}. The Declarations and Reservations (323 kb) (UNHCR, Geneva) also quote the content of the U.S. Senate resolution.

The ATCA provides the subject matter jurisdiction (international-law tort claims by aliens), as detailed above. The DJA provides the remedy (declaratory judgment), as detailed above. And, the APA provides the waiver of sovereign immunity for a U.S. Court to award that remedy against the United States, as detailed above.

The APA (which waives sovereign immunity for “relief other than money damages” on any type of claim for which the U.S. Court has jurisdiction) is like the Tucker Act (which waives sovereign immunity for relief by money damages on non-tort contract claims, and “taking” claims, for which the U.S. Court has jurisdiction) {463 U.S. 206, 212}:

“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. {footnote omitted} The terminology employed in some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. The time has come to resolve this confusion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the United States, {footnote omitted} the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those claims.... {463 U.S. 206, 216}

In United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398, 400 (1976), and in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 538, this Court employed language suggesting that the Tucker Act does not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such language was not necessary to the decision in either case. See infra, at 217-218. Without in any way questioning the result in either case, we conclude that this isolated language should be disregarded. If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively consented to suit.

It nonetheless remains true that the Tucker Act ‘does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages’. United States v. Mitchell, supra, at 538, quoting United States v. Testan, supra, at 398. A substantive right must be found in some other source of law... Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act.... {463 U.S. 206, 218}

In undertaking this inquiry, a court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign immunity in the substantive provision... The Tucker Act itself provides the necessary consent....

Because the Tucker Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature, the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a {463 U.S. 206, 219} second waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915).

“‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.’”

United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949), quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).”

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 216, 218-219 (Jun. 27 1983),bold-face, links, highlighting, and text in {braces} added.

For the Chagos islanders, that “some other source of law” is international tort law; their remedy is in the Declaratory Judgment Act (instead of money, offered by the Tucker Act); their waiver of sovereign immunity for that remedy (declaratory judgment) is in the Administrative Procedure Act (instead of the Tucker Act); and the U.S. Court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide their claim is in the Alien Tort Claims Act (instead of the Tucker Act).

But the Supreme Court has not yet vanquished its confusion entirely: “the United States may not be sued without its consent” (italics added). Were this true, the Chagos islanders could not get their remedy via suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Though entitled to a declaratory judgment remedy by Act of Congress, which waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for that remedy, they have to sue the United States to get it.

Do the Chagos islanders now need the very same second, separate waiver of sovereign immunity which the Supreme Court was at pains to condemn as confused thinking?– One waiver to sue and a second waiver for their remedy? Or would Judge Cardozo regard that as undue “rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced”?

The answer seems simple to me: As the Supreme Court put it: “The time has come to resolve this confusion”: “Such language was not necessary to the decision”; “this isolated language should be disregarded”; “a court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign immunity”; and “the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a second waiver of sovereign immunity”.

Congress plainly agreed with Judge Cardozo and was determined that U.S. Courts should stop creating injustice and hatred, should stop giving the United States blanket immunity for the wrongdoings of its officials, should stop rubber-stamping their actions, should stop thereby licensing them to violate the law, and, instead, should apply their minds case-by-case to whether some special factor, in that particular case, justified immunity. And, the U.S. Department of Justice agreed with Congress, through their spokesman who is now himself a U.S. Supreme Court Justice {1976 USCCAN 6145}:

“Section 1 of S.800 would amend 5 U.S.C. 702 to eliminate the defense of sovereign immunity of the United States in actions in United States courts seeking relief other than money damages. The Department has in the past opposed such a change.

In light of the tenacious and well reasoned support of this proposal by such knowledgeable and responsible organizations as the Administrative Conference of the United States and the American Bar Association, we have reconsidered that opposition, and are now prepared to endorse the concept in principle, and to support the text of S.800, with two small but important changes and a number of caveats concerning its proper interpretation.

The arguments in favor of this aspect of S.800 have been described in testimony presented by others before your Subcommittee. Foremost among them, in my view, is the failure of the criteria for sovereign immunity, as they have been expressed in a long and bewildering series of Supreme Court decisions, to bear any necessary relationship to the real factors which should determine when the Government requires special protection which ordinary litigants would not be accorded....

Indeed, if the present bill is properly understood and properly applied by the courts, it is likely to produce a more stable and predictable system of immunity from suit than the present doctrine of sovereign immunity can ever attain — because it will be a system directly and honestly based upon relevant governmental factors rather than upon a medieval concept whose real vitality is long since gone and which we have tried vainly to convert to rational modern use.

It is not the intent of the Department nor, as I understand it, the intent of the drafters of this bill, that all of the cases which have heretofore been disposed of on the basis of sovereign immunity would in the future {1976 USCCAN 6146} be entertained and adjudicated by the courts. To the contrary, one of the very premises of the proposal is the fact that many (indeed, I would say most) of the cases disposed of on the basis of sovereign immunity could have been decided the same way on other legal grounds, such as: lack of standing; lack of ripeness; availability of an alternative remedy in another court; express or implied statutory preclusion of judicial review; commission of the matter by law to agency discretion; privileged nature of the defendant’s conduct; failure to exhaust administrative remedies; discretionary power to refuse equitable relief; and the ‘political question’ doctrine.”

Antonin Scalia (Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice), May 10 1976, pertaining to the ensuing P.L. 94-574, amending the Administrative Procedure Act to waive sovereign immunity for “relief other than money damages”, 5 U.S.C. § 702, Oct. 21 1976 (1976 USCCAN 6121, 6145-6146, cited more fully above), bold-face, link, and text {in braces} added.

I believe the Jama plaintiffs were entitled to the declaratory judgment they sought against the United States, as one of defendants. This, if their complaint charged the U.S. with violating existing U.S./international law. As to any new law in the treaty, doubtless not, and I haven’t studied their case to discover if their complaint raised new-law issues.

The penniless refugees and their pro bono lawyers, I presume, regarded the prospect of an expensive appeal as daunting and pointless, because the Court upheld its jurisdiction to consider their claim against a load of individual officials and the corporate operator of their detention facility, and stated that their complaint, if true, amounted to a clear violation of U.S./international law. I imagine they got the relief they wanted by way of settlement, though I haven’t investigated this.



  Exceptions to ATCA actions.

Presidential actions not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Does this include all State Department actions? (State is uniquely subject to direction and control of the President). Japan Whaling.


Return to Bancoult v. McNamara (D.D.C., No. 01-CV-2629, filed Dec. 20 2001).

Back to Federal Tort Claims Act.

Forward to Other defenses and issues.

© 2002 Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
This document may be freely copied.


Posted Sept. 1 2002. Updated Dec. 21 2004